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Abstract
In this paper, we tackle the problem of uncertainty in argumentation-based agent negotiation by analyzing the diﬀerent situations
of this uncertainty. In particular, we analyze two types of agents’ uncertainty called Type I and Type II. Uncertainty Type I is the
agent’s uncertainty about selecting the right moves during the dialogue. Uncertainty Type II is the agent’s uncertainty that the
selected move will be accepted by the addressee. More precisely, we discuss these uncertainties in two cases based on the diﬀerent
classes that arguments can belong to. In addition to the theoretical analysis of arguments uncertainty, we implemented the proposed
approach by applying it on a concrete case study (Buyer/Seller scenario). The obtained empirical results conﬁrm the eﬀectiveness of
using our uncertainty-aware techniques and show that our negotiating agents outperform others (which do not use such techniques).
We believe that such analysis will advance the research in the area of argumentation-based negotiation in multiagent systems and
contribute to the automation of the agents’ negotiation.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
In the recent years, argumentation theory has gained an increasing interest from researchers in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence. It has been widely investigated and used to model and analyze dialogue games5,4 and has been used for
decision making under uncertainty2,12. Argumentation provides a powerful tool to represent, model, and reason about
dialogue moves, strategies, and dialogue outcomes. Argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) is one of the most pop-
ular approaches to negotiation. It has been extensively investigated and studied, as witnessed by many publications
such as11,3,6. The core idea is the ability to support oﬀers with justiﬁcations and explanations, which play a key role
in the negotiation settings. So it allows the participants to the negotiation not only to exchange oﬀers, but also reasons
and justiﬁcations that support these oﬀers in order to mutually inﬂuence their preference relations on the set of oﬀers,
and consequently the outcome of the dialogue.
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In this paper, we focus on the negotiating agents’ uncertainty about the exchanged moves in a dialogue game and
their acceptance. The main issues we are investigating are the agent’s uncertainty about selecting the right moves
during the dialogue (so called Uncertainty Type I), the agent’s uncertainty that the selected move will be accepted by
the addressee (so called Uncertainty Type II), and the diﬀerentiation between these two types of uncertainty.
Uncertainty about values of given variables (e.g., the disease aﬀecting a patient in medical applications) can result
from some errors and hence from unreliability (in the case of sensors) or from diﬀerent background knowledge (in
the case of agents). As a result, it is possible to obtain diﬀerent uncertain pieces of information about a given value
from diﬀerent sources. Our aim is to investigate these uncertainty issues that agents face when choose an argument to
advance in argumentation-based negotiations.
Argumentation has been incorporated into negotiation dialogues in the early nineties by Sycara in14. Since then,
several approaches on argumentation-based negotiation have been proposed such as1,9,13,8,3. Most of them are con-
cerned with proposing protocols to show how agents can interact with each other, and how arguments and oﬀers can
be generated, evaluated and exchanged during the negotiation process. However, except our previous work10, none of
them has investigated the agents’ uncertainty about the exchanged arguments and how such an uncertainty could be
measured to assist the agents make a better decision. In10, we introduced the two types of agents’ uncertainty Type
I and Type II. That work was the ﬁrst attempt of its kind in dealing with the agents’ uncertainty to help the agents
reason about their moves, especially in uncertain settings so that they can make better decisions at each dialogue step
and select the right move by considering their beliefs on the opponents’ references. The main idea is to give a good
indicator about the played move to be accepted by the opponent. Moreover, we presented, in the same work, a novel
arguments classiﬁcation based on some criteria that we will make use of in this paper to investigate more those two
types of uncertainty. Based on this classiﬁcation of arguments, we will discuss two diﬀerent cases with regard to the
type of the considered uncertainty. The measurements and analysis we introduce in this paper are of great impor-
tance since they can be used as guidelines for agent designers in order to enhance the negotiation process between
autonomous agents and contribute to the automation of negotiation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give a brief theoretical background on the argumentation system
and agent’s theory in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the two types of agents’ uncertainty and their analysis. Proof
of concepts prototype is presented in Section 4. Finally, we conclude our paper and give some directions for future
work in Section 5.
2. Argumentation system and agent theory
In this section we brieﬂy introduce the argumentation system which was originally introduced by Dung7 but goes
further in dealing with preference and favorite relations between arguments as well as the risk of failure of argument.
Here L is a logical language, KB indicates a possibly inconsistent agent’s knowledge base with no deductive closure,
PAg1,Ag2 indicates the set of agents’ beliefs about the preferences of each other, where Ag1 and Ag2 are the two
negotiating agents, and  stands for classical inference.
Deﬁnition 1. [Argument] An argument Arg is a pair (H, h) where h is a formula ofL and H a subset of KB such that:
i) H is consistent, ii) H  h and iii) H is minimal, so that no subset of H satisfying both i and ii exists. H is called the
support of the argument and h its conclusion.
Deﬁnition 2. [Attack] Let (H, h), (H′, h′) be two arguments. (H′, h′) attacks (H, h) iﬀ H′  ¬h. In other words, an
argument is attacked iﬀ there is an argument for the negation of its conclusion.
We assume that the knowledge base of an agent KB is stratiﬁed into non-overlapping sets KB1, ...,KBn such that
facts in KB1 are the most preferred ones, and facts in the same set are equally preferred. So the preference level is
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. [Preference Level] The preference level of a nonempty subset H of KB denoted by level(H) is the number
of the highest numbered subset of H.
Example 1. Let KB = KB1
⋃
KB2 with KB1 = {a, b} and KB2 = {c, d} and H = {a} and H′ = {a, d}. We have:
level(H) = 1 and level(H′) = 2.
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Deﬁnition 4. [Preference of Argument] Let (H, h) and (H′, h′) be two arguments. The argument (H′, h′) is preferred
over the argument (H, h) for Agi denoted by (H, h) ≤Agipre f (H′, h′) (resp. (H, h) <Agipre f (H′, h′)) iﬀ level(H′) ≤ level(H)
(resp. level(H′) < level(H)).
Agents may also have favorites among their arguments. In order to characterize this notion, we propose in this
paper to use the beliefs of agents about the preferences of other agents. We use the notation BAg1→Ag2 (p), which means
agent Ag1 believes that agent Ag2 believes that p holds, where p is a proposition representing a preference.
Deﬁnition 5. [Favorite Argument] Let (H, h) and (H′, h′) be two arguments. We deﬁne the favorite and the strict
favorite relations as follows:
• (H, h) PAg1 ,Ag2f av (H′, h′) iﬀ BAg1→Ag2 ((H, h) ≤Agipre f (H′, h′)),
• (H, h) ≺PAg1 ,Ag2f av (H′, h′) iﬀ BAg1→Ag2 ((H, h) <Agipre f (H′, h′)).
In order to allow agents to select the most appropriate argument during the negotiation process, we deﬁne the notion
of risk of failure of an argument. This deﬁnition is based on the fact that KB contains certain knowledge, whereas
the set of agents’ beliefs and preferences PAg1,Ag2 contains uncertain beliefs. To deﬁne this notion formally, let |H|∅ be
the number of formulas in H that are not in KB ∪ PAg1,Ag2 , |H|KB be the number of formulas in H that are in KB, and
|H|PAg1 ,Ag2 be the number of formulas in H that are in PAg1,Ag2 .
Deﬁnition 6. [Risk of Failure of an Argument] Let (H, h) and (H′, h′) be two arguments from the set of all arguments
AR that can be built from the logical language L . The risk of failure of an argument denoted by risk(H, h) is a
function mapping an argument to a natural number:
risk : AR→ N (1)
The function risk should satisfy the following: risk(H, h) ≥ risk(H′, h′) iﬀ:
• |H|∅ ≥ |H′|∅; or
• |H|∅ = |H′|∅ and |H|KB ≤ |H′|KB; or
• |H|∅ = |H′|∅, |H|KB = |H′|KB, and |H|PAg1 ,Ag2 ≤ |H′|PAg1 ,Ag2 .
Example 2. Let (H1, h1), (H2, h2) and (H3, h3) be three arguments such that:
|H1|KB = 3, |H1|PAg1 ,Ag2 = 1, and |H1|∅ = 0.|H2|KB = 1, |H2|PAg1 ,Ag2 = 2, and |H2|∅ = 0.|H3|KB = 0, |H3|PAg1 ,Ag2 = 1, and |H3|∅ = 3.
In this example, the risk of failure of the argument (H3, h3) is greater than the risk of failure of the arguments
(H1, h1) and (H2, h2) because the number of formulas in H3 which are not in KB∪PAg1,Ag2 (i.e., |H3|∅) are greater than
those of |H1|∅ and |H2|∅. In the other hand, the risk of failure of the argument (H2, h2) is greater than that of (H1, h1)
because |H2|KB is less than |H1|KB. So, we assign the risk values to the three arguments such that: risk(H3, h3) >
risk(H2, h2) > risk(H1, h1).
3. Agents’ uncertainty analysis
The process of selecting arguments is always associated with a degree of uncertainty. Despite the fact that the
agents are always selecting the most relevant argument at each dialogue step, however, there still be a doubt that the
selected argument is the right one, and it will be accepted by the addressee. The selection of one of the possible
choices is based on the speaker’s knowledge base, and characterized by an amount of uncertainty over this base, as
well as the amount of randomness over the addressee’s knowledge, beliefs, and preferences.
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In this work, we advance our research by analyzing the diﬀerent situations and raise up some cases based on
the number of possible arguments and their classes, which will be deﬁned later in order to be able to determine the
uncertainty type of each move. For instance, if there is only one possible choice (argument), then the probability
of playing this argument will be “1”, and in turn its uncertainty will be “0”. So in this case, do we consider this
uncertainty as Type I or as Type II?. Such a question and others have motivated us to seek the answer by analyzing
the diﬀerent situations and ﬁnding good justiﬁcations. Indeed, this analysis of uncertainty is very important and can
help the negotiating agents decide about their moves in order to achieve their goals. In10, for the uncertainty Type I,
we assume that the probability of each possible argument is given through the risk value of each move, but we did
not elaborate in details on how it can be assigned, in addition to not considering the addressee’s preferences. Whilst
for the uncertainty Type II, these two issues are addressed. We explained in more details how probabilities can be
assigned based on three main criteria involving the addressee’s preferences. These criteria are; Cr1: risk of failure;
Cr2: favorite relation; and Cr3: preference relation. The three criteria have precedence relation over each other, that
is, the order of examining these criteria is important in order to assign probabilities to the diﬀerent arguments available
at each step. Probability assignment is then based on the fact that the knowledge base KB contains certain knowledge,
whereas the set of agent’s beliefs about each other preferences PAg1,Ag2 contains uncertain beliefs. Therefore, the
probability of an argument that belongs to KB to be accepted by the addressee is higher than the probability of
another argument that belongs to the set PAg1,Ag2 . Consequently, the probability of an argument belonging to KB to be
rejected is less than another argument belonging to PAg1,Ag2 . Based on these facts, in the following section we classify
arguments into n diﬀerent classes, and each class is divided into m subclasses.
3.1. Arguments Classiﬁcation
In this section, we classify arguments into n classes C1 to Cn, C1 being the class of arguments having the lowest
risk of failure. Arguments of each class Ck have equal risk, which is less than the risk of any other argument in any
class Ck′ , where k < k′. Formally:




risk(Argi) = risk(Arg j) ∀Arg j ∈ Ck









From this equation, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. The n classes C1, . . . ,Cn, are disjoint, i.e., C1 ∩C2 · · · ∩Cn = ∅.




f av be the favorite equality relation
deﬁned as follows: for two arguments Argi and Arg j, Argi =
PAg1 ,Ag2
f av Arg j iﬀ Argi 
PAg1 ,Ag2
f av Arg j and Arg j 
PAg1 ,Ag2
f av Argi.
The preference equality relation =Ag1pre f is deﬁned from ≤Ag1pre f in the same way. Each subclass Cka is deﬁned as follows:







f av Arg j ∀Arg j ∈ Cka










pre f Arg j ∀Arg j ∈ Ck
Arg j <
Ag1
pre f Argi ∀Arg j ∈
m⋃
l=a+1
Ckl s.t. Argi =
PAg1 ,Ag2
f av Arg j
Arg j >
Ag1
pre f Argi ∀Arg j ∈
a−1⋃
l=1
Ckl s.t. Argi =
PAg1 ,Ag2
f av Arg j
(3)
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This means, arguments in Cka are equally favorable and preferable, more favorable than any other argument which
is in another class Ck
′
a such that k
′ > k, and more preferable than any other equally favorable arguments in Ck′a .
From this equation, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. For each class Ck, the m subclasses Ck1, . . . ,C
k
m, are disjoint, i.e., C
k
1 ∩Ck2 · · · ∩Ckm = ∅.
The following theorem is straightforward from the above equations.
Theorem 3. let k and k′ be two integers such that k < k′. Arguments in the class Ck have higher probability to be
accepted than arguments in the class Ck′ .
3.2. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the uncertainty issue in two diﬀerent cases based on the number of the available argu-
ments and their classes at each dialogue step.
Case 1: If there is only one possible argument per class.
If the agent has just one possible argument at any dialogue step, then the probability of playing this argument will
be at its maximum value (i.e., equal to one to satisfy the probability condition). In fact, since there is no other choice
at that step, the agent will be very certain to play this move. That is, the uncertainty Type I will be at its minimum
value (i.e., equal to zero). Because the argument is unique, and it will be form the class C1. However, the agent cannot
be certain that the opponent will accept that argument because this depends on the value of the risk of failure.
On the other hand, if there are n classes C1 to Cn, but only one possible argument per class, then the argument
should be in C1 and it has the highest probability to be accepted, which means uncertainty type II is represented.
However, the agent is uncertain about its move and it is possible that the argument in C1 is not the most preferred one.
Uncertainty Type I is then represented.
Proposition 1. In ABN dialogue games, at any dialogue step if there is only one possible argument Arg1, then Arg1 ∈
C1, and only uncertainty Type II is represented. If more than one class exist with only one argument, then Types I and
II are both represented.
Case 2: If there is more than one possible argument in one or more classes.
If the agent has more than one possible argument to play at any dialogue step, and all possible arguments having
the same class, then this class is C1 and all the arguments will have the same risk of failure, but they will not be,
necessarily, equally likely to be selected. This depends on the number of subclasses. Arguments belonging to the
highest subclass are more likely, and equally, to be selected. This equality will confuse the agent and make the
uncertainty Type I at its maximum value, i.e., equal to one. The agent is also uncertain about the acceptance of these
arguments depending on the risk of failure. For instance, if the possible arguments have very low risk of failure, the
acceptance probability will be high. In fact, when we look to the class of the argument and its risk of failure, we can
guess how likely this argument will be accepted, because it reﬂects the knowledge about the addressee.
On the other hand, if the possible arguments belong to diﬀerent classes from C1 to Cn, then those arguments are
highly uncertain. The probability assignment will be based on the class of the argument. The higher argument class is,
the more probably to be selected. Thus, the agent will be uncertain about which argument to play “Type I”, and even
after the argument selection, it will be uncertain that the selected argument will be accepted by its opponent “Type II”.
The two types of uncertainty are then represented.
Proposition 2. In ABN dialogue games, at any dialogue step if all possible arguments are in the same class, then the
uncertainty of the selected argument will be at its maximum value “1”. The two types of uncertainty Type I and Type
II are represented If the possible arguments are in the same class or in diﬀerent classes.
Table 1 summarizes the aforementioned cases, and shows when each of the two types of uncertainty is represented.
Theorem 4. In all cases of addressing the uncertainty issues in ABN dialogue games, the agent’s uncertainty Type II
is always represented.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is straightforward from the above propositions.
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Table 1. Arguments classes vs. uncertainty types
One possible argument More than one possible argument









4. Proof of concept prototype
In this section, we describe the implementation of a proof of concept prototype1. The implementation was done
using Java language. In this prototype, we have developed agent superclass, which contains the argumentation sys-
tem, negotiation strategies along with the tools needed for agents to reason and engage in negotiation based on its
uncertainty, the risk of failure of each argument, and the agents’ preferences. Our implementation can be adapted
to wide range of applications; however, in our case we considered a buyer/seller agents scenario. These two agents
are inherited from agent class and we have added speciﬁc negotiation strategies on top of the agent model. On each
run these agents are initialized with diﬀerent set of preferences over the available arguments/oﬀers. We let the agents
exchange oﬀers based on the information available in the knowledge base and the agent’s believes and preferences.
To illustrate better the prototype, let us consider the following case study:
Case Study (Buyer/Seller Scenario):
Let us consider a buyer/seller scenario between two negotiating agents seller and buyer. We assume that the buyer
agent is interested in buying a laptop with certain speciﬁcations (preferences) and a low price from the seller agent.
The seller agent on the other hand, has diﬀerent laptops with diﬀerent speciﬁcations and prices, is trying to convince
the buyer to buy one of them based on its request. Each agent is provided in its knowledge base with a set of diﬀerent
laptops with diﬀerent speciﬁcations (e.g., price, screen size, memory, brand name, etc), as well as a preference relation
over these speciﬁcations. We let the two agents negotiate by generating oﬀers and counter-oﬀers until they achieve an
agreement or end the negotiation without achieving an agreement. In order to compare our proposed method against
others (which do not use such techniques), we run each scenario twice with the exact agents’ setting. In the ﬁrst run,
we let the agents negotiate using our proposed technique to choose the best argument/oﬀer at each dialogue step in
attempt to realize their goal. And in the second run, we let the agents negotiate without considering our technique
(i.e., using pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration). We have chosen three diﬀerent scenarios, in which
we were able to capture all possible outcomes of the negotiation. In the following tables from Table 2 to Table 7, we
summarize our results.
Table 2. Scenario 1a: Negotiation dialogue using our approach
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 8 0.92
√ √
0.69 C2, C3 C2 Rejected
2 Seller 1 0.0
√ √
1.48 C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 3 0.79
√ √
0.13 C1, C3 C1 Rejected
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
In Table 2 Scenario 1a, as we see even though the agents always select the argument with the higher class, and
less risk of failure (ROF), however, in all cases the selected argument was rejected. The interpretation of this is,
for instance, the buyer agent in “step 1”, had “8” possible choices with diﬀerent classes ( from C2 and C3), and
its uncertainty was very high “0.92”, which represents the two types of uncertainty. The same thing for “step 3”.
However, in “step 2”, the seller agent has just one choice with class C3, so its uncertainty was very low to play this
move, but it does not mean that this move will be accepted by the buyer, and this is because of the high risk of
failure. The negotiation was ended without achieving an agreement because all oﬀers and counter-oﬀers were rejected
and there were no more oﬀers for both agent to play. In scenario 1a, the negotiation was ended in very short time
compared to scenario 1b, since there is no theoretical agreement that could be achieved and our negotiating agents
realized that very early, which conﬁrms the eﬃciency of applying our techniques compared to the other scenario
1 The source code of the implementation is available at this link: https://github.com/Marooned202/negotiation
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Table 3. Scenario 1b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 8 0.92 N/A N/A N/A C1,C2, C3 C Rejected
2 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 2 0.84 - - - C1, C3 C1 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C1 C1 Rejected
5 Buyer 2 0.96 - - - C2, C3 C2 Rejected
6 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C1, C2 C1 Rejected
7 Buyer 2 0.18 - - - C1, C3 C1 Rejected
8 Seller 2 1.00 - - - C2 C2 Rejected
9 Buyer 2 0.83 - - - C1, C3 C1
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
in Table 3 Scenario 1b, where the same negotiation was ended without achieving an agreement in much more time
“9 steps”. In this scenario, agents do not select the most appropriate move at each dialogue step and this result in
consuming more time and at the end they were not able to achieve an agreement.
In the same way we interpret the other scenarios. In Table 4 Scenario 2a, Our negotiating agents were able to
achieve an agreement in a very short time compared to the other Scenario 2b in Table 5, where the agents could not
achieve such an agreement. Likewise the Scenarios 3a and 3b, in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. The negotiation was
ended successfully with achieving an agreement on the sellers oﬀer in both scenarios, but in our case, the negotiating
agents reached the agreement in much less time.
Table 4. Scenario 2a: Negotiation dialogue using our approach
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 8 0.97
√ √
0.27 C1, C2, C3 C1 Rejected
2 Seller 1 1.0
√
0.83 C1 C1 Accepted
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s oﬀer
Table 5. Scenario 2b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 8 0.93 N/A N/A N/A C2, C3 C3 Rejected
2 Seller 2 1.00 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 1 0.0 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.95 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
Table 6. Scenario 3a: Negotiation dialogue using our approach
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 10 0.93
√ √
0.08 C1, C2, C3 C1 Accepted
2 Seller 1 0.0
√ √
0.83 C3 C3
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s oﬀer
Table 7. Scenario 3b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration
Step Agent # of oﬀers Uncertainty Type I Type II ROF of Chosen Arg. Available Arg. Class. Chosen Arg. Class Arg. Status
1 Buyer 10 0.90 N/A N/A N/A C1,C2, C3 C3 Rejected
2 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C2 C2 Rejected
3 Buyer 2 0.96 - - - C1, C3 C3 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.98 - - - C1, C2 C2 Rejected
5 Buyer 2 0.52 - - - C1, C3 C3 Rejected
6 Seller 2 0.90 - - - C1, C3 C1 Accepted
7 Buyer 2 0.98 - - - C1, C2 C1
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s oﬀer
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5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have investigated the agents’ uncertainty in argumentation-based negotiation. In particular, we
have analyzed the two types of agent’s uncertainty proposed in10, namely uncertainty Type I and uncertainty Type II.
In this context, two cases that consider diﬀerent classes of arguments are distinguished, and theoretical analysis of the
uncertainty assessments are provided. We implemented the proposed approach by applying it on a concrete case study
(buyer/seller scenario). The obtained empirical results conﬁrm the eﬀectiveness of using our techniques and show
that our negotiating agents outperform others, which are using pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration.
As future direction of this work, we are interesting in calculating some metrics on diﬀerent parameters, such as the
competence of each agent relatively to the selection of its arguments, and considering diﬀerent agent types and their
degree of trust. We are also planing to investigate some negotiation strategies which facilitate the achievement of an
agreement, analyzing and evaluating those strategies from the optimization perspective. Analyzing the computational
complexity of such optimization problems is another direction for future work.
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